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Synopsis
Topics chosen from first-year calculus illustrate a number of “sayings” or “proverbs,”
the first three, for example, being: be awed, like a child; meaning before truth;
and act with intention. Many are proverbs for life as well as mathematics.
Keywords: calculus, proverbs, sayings.
0. the list
After some years of teaching, I found myself repeating certain “sayings” or
“proverbs,” each capturing one facet of the “mathematical way of thinking.”
As the years went by, the number of these proverbs grew, and eventually I
collected them in a list which I would hand out on the first day of class. They
are proverbs for any mathematics class, not just calculus. Some are proverbs
for life.
1 be awed, like a child
2 meaning before truth
3 act with intention
4 account for assumptions
5 god gives, we choose
6 make your dreams come true
7 plausibility before proof
8 princess di then atticus finch
9 guess bravely and beautifully
10 understanding is translating
11 celebrate your mistakes
12 explore the tug of war
13 too beautiful to be false
14 do you believe in magic?
15 follow the veil: be moved by mystery
16 philosophy matters
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Though a given saying might surface several times over a semester, here we
illustrate each proverb with just one calculus topic.
1. be awed, like a child
If I had influence with the good fairy... I should ask that her gift
to each child in the world be a sense of wonder so indestructible
that it would last throughout life. – rachel carson [5, page 44]
Ah, the first day of class. So much joy, excitement, and mystery ahead of us!
Do you remember the last time you felt genuine awe? Do you remember the
first time? I do. I was only six or seven, lying on my back in the grass at
night, the stars of the Milky Way spread out across the black sky. And the
next morning my dad said, “you know, the sun is a star.” Talk about having
your mind blown twice in the span of one day!
What happens to us? Where does that awe go? Do we start to worry that we
look silly with our mouths open? Does the awe get schooled out of us? Really,
shouldn’t school be filling us with awe? Especially here, now, in college?
So many classes to choose from, so many new, sexy subjects: anthropology,
classics, cognitive science, data science, economics, gender studies, linguistics,
neuroscience, psychology, religious studies, philosophy. Such potential for
awe there. But actually, the discipline with the greatest potential for awe is
not new. It’s the oldest of disciplines, the one you’ve all studied since you
were babies: mathematics.
We all know the stereotypes — the boring high school math teacher whose
monotone delivery drones the students to sleep and mathematics portrayed
as deadly dry number crunching. Yet nothing, literally nothing, could be
further from the truth:
• Mathematics, especially at the upper levels, exhibits a crystalline aes-
thetic beauty unlike any other discipline. As Bertrand Russell put it,
“Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme
beauty — a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without
appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trap-
pings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern
perfection such as only the greatest art can show. . . .” [20, page 32]
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• Imagination and creativity abound: “There is an astonishing imagina-
tion,” said Voltaire, “even in the science of mathematics.... We repeat,
there was far more imagination in the head of Archimedes than in
that of Homer.” [7, page 126] Unconstrained by the physical universe,
the freedom of invention is extraordinary, limited only by what can be
imagined. A mathematician can imagine, define, and study intricate
and beautiful algebraic structures, higher (even infinite) dimensional
exotic spaces and geometries — all not of this world, existing only in
the human mind. “There is nothing as dreamy and poetic, nothing as
radical, subversive, and psychedelic, as mathematics. It is every bit as
mind blowing as cosmology or physics . . . and allows more freedom of
expression than poetry, art, or music . . . . Mathematics is the purest of
the arts, as well as the most misunderstood." [17, page 23]
• Unlike other disciplines, mathematics puts us in direct contact with
the infinite — sets countably and uncountably infinite, sets of infi-
nite length, area, and volume, infinite limits, infinite integrals, infinite
sequences, infinite sums, infinite “polynomials,” infinite dimensional
spaces — and even gives us the god-like powers to define precisely and
control every one of these infinite concepts and processes! “The goal of
mathematics,” writes Hermann Weyl, “is the symbolic comprehension
of the infinite with human, that is finite, means.” [26, page 12]
• Using axioms, definitions, and logic of pristine clarity, the language of
modern mathematics has no ambiguity. Mathematicians communicate
their findings across the globe in rigorous proofs with perfect precision.
There are no debates in mathematics. When a proof is extremely com-
plex and difficult — Andrew Wiles’s proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem in
1995 was 129 pages long — there may be a pause, while the mathemat-
ical community, in seminars around the world, studies the argument
looking for flaws — but in the end the final verdict is unanimous. No
debate? Perfect precision? Sound like any other discipline? No.
• Modern mathematics has great power and sophistication, and yet many,
many deep and exciting problems remain unsolved. Here’s just one: 5
and 7, 11 and 13, 17 and 19 are examples of “twin primes.” Is the
number of twin primes finite or infinite? To this day, no one knows.
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Of the seven Millennium Prize Problems set out by the Clay Mathe-
matics Institute in 2000, only one had been solved as this writing.
• “[Nature] is written in that great book which ever is before our eyes,”
wrote Galileo, “. . . but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn
the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written. The book
is written in mathematical language.” [11, page 350] Does it surprise
us that the Universe has always expressed itself in the language of
mathematics? It shouldn’t. To understand the universe, we strive to
illuminate its structures and patterns, and mathematics is the language
and study of structure and pattern! In the mathematics of Einstein’s
general theory of relativity, the universe is a four-dimensional spacetime
“surface” whose curvature, determined by mass, varies from point to
point and where light travels along “curving” paths of least length.
In more modern “string theories,” spacetime may have 10, 11, or 25
dimensions! M-theory, in particular, posits extended two-dimensional
membranes and five spatial dimensions that reside in a universe of
eleven dimensions!
• Even at our level here, in Calculus I, the fantastically varied and seem-
ingly uncountable applications come from almost every area you can
think of: acoustics, archeology, biology, business, chemistry, computer
science, ecology, economics, engineering, environmental science, gov-
ernment, health science, music theory, neuroscience, medicine, physics,
the list goes on. I’m handing out a sample list of some several hundred




credit card payment structure
spread of infectious diseases
trajectories of Martian probes
earthquake-proof buildings
detecting art forgeries
present value of an oil well
modeling whale populations
surface area of a black hole
predicting hurricane paths
algorithms for search engines
dating ancient cave paintings
Bruce H. Pourciau 319
pollution of marine ecosystems
...
stability of planetary orbits
...
I’ve just read thirty or so of the roughly five hundred applications on
the handout, and that five hundred represents just the tiniest of tiny
slivers of what’s actually out there. At the end of Calculus I, this is
the kind of power you will wield!
If this course rekindles your child-like sense of awe, not just for mathematics,
but for all the awesome things this college, this world, this universe, have to
offer, I will be very happy.
Over the next weeks, various proverbs will arise in a natural way, each en-
closing a kernel of truth concerning this course, and sometimes concerning
life in general. The first proverb, be awed, like a child, may be the most
fundamental.
2. meaning before truth
In this list of applications I just handed out, we have glimpsed the enormous
power of calculus. Given the incredible number and variety of these appli-
cations, it would be natural to assume that calculus must be an absurdly
complicated subject. Yet calculus is so beautiful in no small part because it
is so simple. In fact, unbelievably, nearly all of its power stems from solving
just two simply-stated geometric problems: Find the slope at the point P and




Yes, Rowen? How can that be? That’s exactly the question, isn’t it? How
can it be that all that power and variety can derive from solving these two
simple problems? After all, you can’t get something from nothing, right?
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It just has to be that these two geometric problems, both simple to state,
are not actually simple to solve! In fact, that’s not the half of it, by which I
mean: these two problems – Find the slope at P and Find the area of D –
are really just the second halves of two-part problems, the first halves being,
What do we mean by the slope at P? and What do we mean by the area of
D?
And here we have one of our proverbs: meaning before truth, which
means, Do not ask whether a given statement is true until you know what
it means. If, for example, I were to claim that “The floop at point P is 1”
or “The glorb of region D is 2,” it would obviously make no sense to debate
the truth of these statements until we had agreed on the meanings of these
statements, meanings which depend entirely on the meanings of “floop at
point P ” and “glorb of region D.” And the same goes for “slope” and “area.”
Of course we have clear meanings for the slope of a line and the area of
a rectangle, but we need clear and precise mathematical meanings for the
“slope at point P ” and the “area of region D,” before we can find that slope
or find that area. And it is here, in the struggle to formulate these two
definitions, precisely and mathematically, where we find the true subtleties
of calculus and the true source of its great power. For it is here where the
subtle notion of limit gets developed and applied.
This proverb, meaning before truth, fundamental everywhere in mathe-
matics, is fundamental in life as well. In so many of our debates, arguments,
and everyday back and forth discussions, we use the same words and phrases,
but with different meanings, and confused by confusions of meaning we end
up talking past each other.
3. act with intention
Here’s a question: What does a mathematician do? Emily? She proves theo-
rems? I like that answer! Well, apart, of course, from department meetings,
faculty meetings, committee meetings, grading, lecturing, advising, supervis-
ing independent studies, going to talks, meeting with prospective students,
responding to emails, and so on, yes, she proves theorems. Technically,
though, a theorem is a theorem because it’s already been proved. So we
might say she proves conjectures, which then become theorems. And how
does she come up with reasonable conjectures? She guesses!! Naturally, I
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don’t mean wild, out-of-the-blue, baseless guesses. That would be a silly
waste of time. No, I mean guesses based on plausible reasoning applied to
the evidence drawn from examples.
Once proved, a conjecture becomes a theorem. What that theorem might
involve would, of course, depend on the area of mathematics it comes from —
algebra, analysis, combinatorics, geometry and topology, or number theory
— but no matter the area, the most likely objects of study are functions.
Here in Calculus I and II, a branch of analysis, we investigate functions that
take real numbers to real numbers. Calculus theorems can involve a single,
particular function, such as —
theorem The function f : r0, 1s Ñ R given by
fpxq :“
#
0 if x is rational
1 if x is irrational
is not integrable.
theorem Extend hpxq “ |x| from r´1, 1s to R by requiring hpx` 2q “ hpxq.







is continuous everywhere yet differentiable nowhere.
— whatever integrable, continuous, and differentiable mean.
But much more commonly, calculus theorems apply to an entire class of
functions. Of course the power of such a theorem increases with both the
breadth of the class and the interest and usefulness of its conclusions. Since
we are unlikely to be able to say anything interesting or useful about the
(too wildly diverse) class of all functions, it makes sense to look for a mild
restriction of that class which does lead to conclusions both interesting and
useful. One natural candidate for that restriction, expressed intuitively —
that the graph of f is “unbroken” — is certainly not mild enough, for it rules
out an entire swath of the elementary functions, all of which we would like
to keep in the tent. Even the graph of the simplest rational function 1{x is
“broken” (at x “ 0). Yet notice that for every elementary function with a
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broken graph, the breaks do not occur at points of the graph, but only at
points where the function is undefined. The graph of 1{x, for example, is
actually “unbroken” at each of its points. Functions with this property are
said to be continuous :
intuitive definition We call a function f continuous if its graph is “un-
broken” at each of its points, that is, if its graph is “unbroken” at px, fpxqq
for each x in the domain of f .
Let’s work toward making this rough, intuitive definition more precise. What
do we mean when we say the graph of f is “unbroken” at pc, fpcqq? Well,
what do we mean when we say the graph is “broken” at pc, fpcqq? Here’s an




In this figure, based on the values fpxq as xÑ c, f appears to be “intending”
to do one thing at c, namely to take on the value L, but actually at c the
function f does something entirely different:
L ‰ fpcq
intention of f at c ‰ action of f at c
Replacing one intuition with another, we can then rewrite our rough defini-
tion of continuity:
intuitive definition (revised) We call a function f continuous if
intention of f at c “ action of f at c
for each c in the domain of f .
Ah, but remember a core intuition from our days discussing limits: that the
limit of f as xÑ c measures the “intention of f at c.” To refresh that mem-
ory, let’s imagine that in the minutes leading up to 11 o’clock, instead of
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being here in class with you, suppose that I’m outside the president’s office,
pacing, thinking of asking for a raise, all the while muttering, “At 11 I’m
going to knock on this door.” In the seconds leading up to 11, I’m still mut-
tering, “At 11 I’m going to knock on this door.” And in the milliseconds and
microseconds leading up to 11, I’m still muttering, “At 11 I’m going to knock
on this door.” What would you say is my intention at 11? Of course, yes, to
knock on the president’s door. Similarly, we think of limxÑc fpxq as measur-
ing the “intention of f at c,” because it represents what f seems to be in-
tending to do at c based, not on what f does at c, but rather on what f does
at x ’s leading up to (and leading down to) and getting arbitrarily close to c.
But back to the president’s door, where my intention at 11 was to knock on
the door. Now what I actually do at 11, my action at 11, could very well be
different from my intention at 11: perhaps I freeze and do nothing, perhaps
I dance a jig, or perhaps my action at 11 matches my intention at 11 and
I knock on the door. In this last case, when action matches intention, we
might say that I acted (consistent) with intention or, more oddly,
that I acted continuously at 11.
When action matches intention for functions, the term “continuous” is not
odd, but standard:
definition We say f is continuous if limxÑc fpxq “ fpcq for every c in the
domain of f , where we use the appropriate left or right limit when the domain
contains an interval with endpoint c.
We have made our intuitive definition precise. Containing the set of all
elementary functions as a very thin slice, the class C of continuous functions
is really quite broad, and with further restrictions we obtain theorems with
conclusions both interesting and useful, some fundamental examples being:
theorem The continuous image of an interval is an interval.
corollary (intermediate value theorem) Given a continuous func-
tion defined on an interval, every number between two values of the function
must also be a value of the function.
extreme value theorem A continuous function on a closed and bounded
interval attains global extremes.
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4. account for assumptions
Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off
every once in a while, or the light won’t come in. –alan alda [1]
At the end of our last class, we had stated, as a corollary, a rather famous
theorem:
intermediate value theorem Given a continuous function defined on
an interval, every number between two values of the function must also be a
value of the function.
Now, how should we study such a theorem? Naturally, we should read its
statement with great care, perhaps draw a figure to illustrate it, and then go
through the proof line by line. If we can follow it, the proof may convince
us that the theorem is true — not that most of us would ever really doubt
a theorem appearing in a textbook – but more crucially, a theorem asserts a
connection between the assumptions and the conclusion, and the proof lays
bare the path connecting them. To understand a proof, then, is to have
walked that path, taking in and making your own all the twists, turns, and
scenery along the way.
But what if we can’t understand the proof? What if we can follow each
individual step, but cannot anticipate the next, and can’t figure out why the
steps were taken? Or, like the intermediate value theorem here, what
if the theorem is asserted without proof? How should we study a theorem in
such cases?
Whether a theorem is stated with a proof or without, we can always ac-
count for assumptions, in two opposing directions. First, the study of
specific examples where all the assumptions hold can supply some intuition
and insight into why those assumptions, taken together, might be sufficient
for the conclusion. (Of course, only a rigorous proof could replace this “might
be” with complete conviction.) And second, the construction of what we call
accounting counterexamples — one for each assumption, where that assump-
tion only fails, along with the conclusion — will account for each individual
assumption by telling us why that assumption is necessary for the conclusion.
To see, for example, that each assumption of the intermediate value the-
orem, interval and continuity, is necessary, we need two accounting counters.
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Volunteers? Ezra and Eliah?
N
N
Perfect. In the left figure, the domain is an interval, but the function is
not continuous, while in the right figure the function is continuous but the
domain is not an interval. And in each case, the conclusion fails, for we can
see that the number N lies between two values of the function, yet is not
itself a value.
The assumptions of a theorem, like the two assumptions of the interme-
diate value theorem, are generally quite explicit. But not always. For
example, on its face the following statement —
extreme value theorem A continuous function on a closed and bounded
interval attains global extremes.
— could be read as asserting that the conclusion holds only for some par-
ticular closed and bounded interval and some particular continuous function
on that interval. Instead, mathematicians understand this statement to have
hidden but implicitly understood “for every” quantifiers: For every closed
and bounded interval and for every continuous function on that interval . . . .
Other assumptions in mathematics are hidden much more deeply. Nearly all
mathematicians, for instance, assume that mathematical assertions refer to
“things” — numbers, sets, functions, matrices, spaces, and the like — that
stand apart from us and, as a consequence, they assume that a mathematical
assertion must be either true or false, quite independently of our knowing (or
being able to know) which. We might call these “background assumptions,”
for there is no conscious act of accepting these assumptions, no awareness of
having made them. Deeply ingrained, these background assumptions shape
how we “see” mathematics — sanctioning various procedures, determining
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what constitutes a legitimate proof and what makes an important line of
inquiry. Later in the course, if we ever encounter some unexpected free time,
we can return to this topic (which belongs to the philosophy of mathematics!)
for a fuller discussion.
Outside of mathematics, each of us has a personal collection of background
assumptions which shape our fears and concerns, our attitudes, arguments,
and conclusions, how we see and respond to the world around us. To identify
such a deeply entrenched assumption, to remove it, at least temporarily, then
to see the world without it and ask, Can I account for this assumption? Is it
justified? — this is a very difficult task, often unpleasant, but vital. “Your
assumptions are your windows on the world,” as Alan Alda put it, “scrub
them off every once in a while, or the light won’t come in.”
5. god gives, we choose
[while tapping a balloon to keep it in the air] We’ve been working with limits
for awhile now, calculating specific limits, stating and applying various limit
laws, like the squeeze theorem, but along the way we have reminded
ourselves that we really can’t be certain about any of our limit calculations
or limit laws. Why? Because the rough and intuitive definitions of limit
statements which have served us well so far lack the precision required for the
construction of rigorous proofs. It’s finally time to fix this serious problem.
Let’s begin with the simplest case: gpxq Ñ `8 as x Ñ `8. [still bouncing
the balloon] You know, when I took abstract algebra in college, the professor
wore white gloves every day, and no one asked him why, until, on the very
last day, someone finally did. Turned out he’d become allergic to chalk! A
rather unfortunate allergy for a mathematics professor. Yes, Jon? Why do I
keep bouncing this balloon? Gee, I’m glad you asked. It’s a prop, since the
real thing is too big to bring into class. At home, I have a magic weather
balloon. It’s filled with a gas lighter than helium, lighter than hydrogen,
lighter even than a vacuum!
claim When let go, my magic balloon will rise toward infinity.
Question: how would you test my claim? Silas? What does this claim even
mean? Oh, yes, the perfect counter-question! One of our proverbs, right?
meaning before truth: Do not ask whether a statement is true until you
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know what it means. We cannot debate the truth of my claim until we know
precisely what that claim means. But it is exactly that, namely the precise
meaning of my claim, which we were trying to tease out with the question,
How would you test my claim? Soren? I would agree: we’re traversing a
circle.
To get off this circle, let’s agree to treat my claim — that my balloon will rise
toward infinity — intuitively and apply that intuition to see if we can agree
on what we should take for the precise meaning of my claim. So, back to
my question: How would you test my claim? Laura? Pose some challenging
heights? Excellent idea. Let the balloon go and check. Does it rise higher
than that tree? Higher than that cloud? Higher than 10 miles? 100 miles? If
my magic balloon were able to rise above every one of your specific challenges,
you might be very impressed with my balloon, but still doubt my claim, for
no matter how many specific challenging heights the balloon surpasses, there
could still be some even higher challenging height that it would fail to surpass.
So somehow, you would have to become convinced that given any arbitrary
challenging height, no matter how large, my magic balloon will rise above
that height.
provisional definition of my claim “my magic balloon will rise toward
infinity”: given any challenging height, no matter how high, the balloon will
rise above that height.
Let’s examine this provisional definition to see if it matches our intuitive
understanding of my claim. Suppose my balloon kept rising above the chal-
lenging heights, but in between those high flying times it kept sinking back
down to the ground. Note that this odd behavior would be permitted by our
provisional definition, but does it correspond with the intuitive meaning we
assign to “rising toward infinity”? Maybe, maybe not. Do we want to rule
out this odd behavior by revising our provisional definition? It’s totally up
to us, for we are the masters of meaning:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor
less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words
mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty
Dumpty, “which is to be master — that’s all.” [4, page 57]
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Shall we put it to a vote? Raise your hand if you think we should revise our
provisional definition. OK, let’s revise it. We need to make sure that the
balloon can’t keep coming back down. Said differently, given any challenging
height, eventually the balloon must rise above that height and stay above
that height.
definition of my claim “my magic balloon will rise toward infinity”:
given any challenging height, no matter how high, the balloon eventually
will rise above that height to stay. More explicitly, given any challenging
height E, there exists a time D such that for every time t ą D, the balloon
will be above E.
Now let’s apply this line of reasoning to define our limit statement:
definition The assertion gpxq Ñ `8 as x Ñ `8 means: given any chal-
lenging measure E ą 0 of bigness of gpxq, we can choose some responding
measure D ą 0 of bigness of x such that for every x,
x ą D implies gpx q ą E .
The wordy phrasing of this definition highlights its challenge-response char-
acter, but we can be more concise:
definition The assertion gpxq Ñ `8 as x Ñ `8 means: given any E ą 0,
we can choose some D ą 0 such that for every x,
x ą D implies gpx q ą E .
Note that E is given first and is arbitrary, while D is chosen, second, and is
definitely not arbitrary, for it is chosen in response to and is dependent on
the given E. To stress this logic, I like to say: first, E is given by God, then,
second, some D is chosen by us in response. god gives, we choose.
Let’s press PAUSE for a minute and think about what just happened. An
assertion about an “infinite process,” gpxq Ñ `8 as x Ñ `8, having at first
just a rough intuitive sense, has been assigned a perfectly precise mathemat-
ical meaning in completely finite terms: given any E ą 0, we must be able
to produce some D ą 0 such that one inequality implies another inequality.
What Hermann Weyl wrote so beautifully bears repeating: “The goal of
mathematics is the symbolic comprehension of the infinite with human, that
is finite, means.” [26, page 12]
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The rough definitions we have given for other limit statements can be made
precise in the same way, except that the challenge or the response may be a
measure of closeness rather than bigness. For instance:
definition For numbers L and c, the assertion gpxq Ñ L as x Ñ c` means:
given any ε ą 0, we can choose some δ ą 0 such that for every x,
c ă x ă c` δ implies L´ ε ă gpxq ă L` ε
Here the challenge ε is a measure of closeness to L, and the response δ is
a measure of closeness to c. For the measures of closeness, the traditional
ε and δ follow Cauchy ([6], also see [12, page 44]), while for the measures
of bigness, there is no tradition, but the E and D follow Stein [22, page
88]. Given the pleasing big-small and Roman-Greek correspondences in the
pairings E-ε and D-δ, the letters E and D really should be traditional.
As E is a measure of bigness and ε a measure of smallness, we sometimes see
descriptive phrases like, “where E can be arbitrarily large” or “where ε can be
made arbitrarily small.” Which reminds me of a story involving the English
mathematicians G. H. Hardy and J. E. Littlewood, who, during the first half
of the 20th century, formed the most famous and productive mathematical
collaboration in history.
One Sunday morning, in Littlewood’s rooms at Cambridge, Hardy, reading
over the page proofs for one of their papers, called Littlewood over, pointed
to a blank spot, and asked, “Shouldn’t there be an ε there?” Littlewood
nodded, then looked more closely. “What’s that?” he said. “What?” Hardy
replied. Littlewood retrieved a magnifying glass from his desk, set it over
the blank spot, where a tiny speck, enlarged, resolved itself into the tiniest
ε either of them had ever seen. The text that followed in the page proof,
“where ε can be arbitrarily small,” had apparently been taken quite literally
by the printer!
Before class, because I knew I’d want to tell this funny story, I looked for
the source. The closest thing I could find was the following account in the
delightful little book, Littlewood’s Miscellany :
A minute I wrote (about 1917) for the Ballistic Office ended with
the sentence ’Thus σ should be made as small as possible.’ This
did not appear in the printed minute, but P. J. Grigg said, ’What
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is that?’ A speck in a blank space at the end proved to be the
tiniest σ I had ever seen (the printers must have scoured London
for it). [16, page 56]
Apparently, the story I’ve just told you, set in Littlewood’s rooms, the story
I’ve been telling generations of students, is mostly fiction, based on a tiny
speck of truth — though even that speck, first a σ then an ε, got altered
in my telling. So we have Littlewood’s σ anecdote, presumably true, and
we have my ε story, not true, but more beautiful, like a Hollywood movie
adaptation. Following Hermann Weyl — “My work has always tried to unite
the True with the Beautiful and when I had to choose one or the other, I
usually chose the Beautiful” [8]– I like my story better.
god gives, you choose. Always remember, your intellect is a gift from
God. Others, not so graced, long for what you have been given. Choose a
life and a way of living that honor this gift.
6. make your dreams come true (then make amends).
In the broad light of day mathematicians check their equations
and their proofs, leaving no stone unturned in their search for
rigour. But, at night, under the full moon, they dream, they float
among the stars and wonder at the miracle of the heavens. They
are inspired. Without dreams there is no art, no mathematics, no
life. –michael atiyah [2, page 267]
We’ve just seen that the derivative of a sum is the sum of the derivatives.
Let’s turn to products. Since pf ` gq1 “ f 1 ` g1, we might initially wonder
if pfgq1 “ f 1g1, but simple counterexamples say no: px2q1 “ 2x but x1x1 “ 1.
What then is the correct formula for pfgq1? Because the formula for pfgq1
surely involves f 1 and g1, we expect the Newton quotient for fg involves, or
can be made to involve, the Newton quotients for f and g. If ppxq “ fpxqgpxq,
then
ppx` hq ´ ppxq
h
“
fpx` hqgpx` hq ´ fpxqgpxq
h
Do we see the Newton quotient for, say, f? Yes! No! Well, sort of, but
we can’t factor it out, because the factors gpx ` hq and gpxq are different.
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In our dreams, these two factors would be the same so we could pull out the
Newton quotient for f :
fpx` hqgpx` hq ´ fpxqgpx` hq
h
“
fpx` hq ´ fpxq
h
¨ gpx` hq
Our subconscious created this dream expression from reality, from the New-
ton quotient for the product, by subtracting fpxqgpx`hq instead of fpxqgpxq.
This bull-in-the-china-shop behavior has broken the tie with reality — duh,
it’s a dream — but we can repair the broken equality with the Newton
quotient and still make our dreams come true by undoing (making
amends for) the aggressive actions of our subconscious, that is, by undoing
the subtraction of fpxqgpx` hq and redoing the subtraction of fpxqgpxq:
ppx` hq ´ ppxq
h
“
fpx` hqgpx` hq ´ fpxqgpx` hq ` fpxqgpx` hq ´ fpxqgpxq
h
“
fpx` hq ´ fpxq
h
¨ gpx` hq ` fpxq ¨
gpx` hq ´ gpxq
h
Ñ f 1pxqgpxq ` fpxqg1pxq
Although we did this subtract-add trick to make the Newton quotient for
f appear, note that the Newton quotient for g appeared as well, without
our even trying! By the way, some textbooks write this product rule as
pfgq1 “ fg1 ` gf 1, instead of f 1g ` fg1. The latter is better: it points us
toward the correct extension for longer products — for example, pfghq1 “
f 1gh`fg1h`fgh1 — and with just a change of sign it gives us the numerator
of the quotient rule.
7. plausibility before proof
Does anyone remember what we mean by an “elementary function”? Soren?
Yes, exactly right:
definition An elementary function is (a) a polynomial, exponential func-
tion, logarithmic function, trigonometric function, or inverse trigonometric
function or (b) a finite combination of the functions in (a) using addition,
subtraction, multiplication, division, and composition.
From the day we first introduced the derivative, we have wanted to get to
the point where we could differentiate every elementary function. That goal
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is now within reach. At this point, we can differentiate every function in
category (a) and, with just one omission, all the combinations in category
(b). That omission, though, is glaring: the derivative of a composite.
So how do we find the rule for differentiating a composite: pf ˝ gq1 “ ? We
could of course just look it up in our textbook, but if we really want to find
the rule ourselves, a textbook might be the last place to look for advice.
Textbooks create the illusion that theorems, like colorful pieces of beach
glass, just appear in front of us, already formed and smoothed, ready to
be studied, proved, and applied. Textbooks mostly ignore a central part of
mathematics — making conjectures.
To make a conjecture, we could begin by studying many examples, hoping
to see some pattern which might hold generally. In another strategy, we
could interpret, physically or geometrically, the concept or quantity being
studied, apply our knowledge of how that physical or geometric quantity
would behave, and then conjecture that the purely mathematical quantity
might behave in the same way.
Let’s use this second strategy to see if we can anticipate the rule for differen-
tiating a composite. We begin with what we call the “optical interpretation”




Leaving the point x on the slide, the ray of light, bent by the lens g, arrives
at the point gpxq on the screen. With this optical interpretation of g, both
the Newton quotient and the derivative represent magnifications:





“ average magnification on rx, x` hs Ñ magnification at x
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Thus the derivative g1pxq measures the magnification produced by the g-lens
at the point x. In the optical interpretation of a composite f ˝ g, we would






Now if the g-lens magnifies tiny intervals at x by 2, say, and the f -lens
magnifies tiny intervals at gpxq by 3, then of course the composite f ˝ g will
magnify tiny intervals at x by 3 ¨ 2 “ 6, because magnifications, produced by
lenses in series, multiply! And hence, in general, we would expect that
pf ˝ gq1pxq “ magnification of f ˝ g at x
“ rmagnification of f at gpxqs ¨ rmagnification of g at xs
“ f 1rgpxqs ¨ g1pxq
which leads to our conjectured
composite rule pf ˝ gq1pxq “ f 1rgpxqs ¨ g1pxq
While this argument does not prove anything, it does succeed in producing
a conjecture (without any smoothness conditions of course) and in making
that conjecture quite plausible. Let’s call it a plausibility argument.
Plausibility arguments can be used, as we did today, to help us make con-
jectures, but they can also be used when a theorem has been given to us
without proof, to help us gain some intuition into the plausibility of that
theorem. Even when a proof of the theorem has been given to us, a plau-
sibility argument may still offer important insight, for a proof, laid out in
a series irrefutable steps, may supply complete conviction, yet incomplete
understanding. “We are not very pleased,” writes Hermann Weyl, “when we
are forced to accept a mathematical truth by virtue of a complicated chain
of formal conclusions and computations, which we traverse blindly, link by
link, feeling our way by touch. We want first an overview of the aim and of
the road; we want to understand the idea of the proof, the deeper context.”
[25, page 177]
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8. princess di then atticus finch
For the last week or more, we have separately taken up several ways of ana-
lyzing the behavior of a given function. Now it’s time to put these methods
together and apply them in concert. Because such concerted effort can in-
volve quite a bit of work, it will pay us to be organized bookkeepers, applying
our methods in an efficient order. princess di then atticus finch may
have appeared on the list of proverbs we handed out on the first day, but that
was really a sham, for it’s not a proverb at all, but rather a pronunciation
guide for diadecis (d̄i´AT´ icus), an ancient Greek mathematician (not










A Asymptotic and boonies behavior
f 1
#











“Boonies behavior”?? Anyone? Soren? Yes, exactly: “boonies” is short
for “boondocks,” meaning a remote region, so “boonies behavior” refers to
the behavior as x Ñ ˘8. (To give credit where credit is due, even if it’s
anonymous, I used to call this “far away behavior,” until one summer, in a
class I was giving for high school calculus teachers, one of the participants
suggested “boonies behavior,” and I’ve been using the alliteration ever since.)
Before we run through diadecis for any specific functions, let’s introduce
a notation convenient for investigating and recording intercept, asymptotic,
and boonies behavior. Our intuition tells us that fpxq “ x2px´ 1q3 “behaves







as xÑ ´2, and that fpxq “ x2` x “behaves like” gpxq “ x2
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as x Ñ `8. How can we express this “behaves like” mathematically? Note
that, in each of these cases, the quotient f{g tends to a positive finite limit.
definition As xÑ c, suppose both f and g tend to `8 (or ´8 or 0). We
say f and g are asymptotic as x Ñ c and write f „ g if the quotient f{g
tends to some positive finite limit. Here c may be finite or ˘8.
The “behaves like” behavior encoded in f „ g as x Ñ c certainly does
not imply that the absolute difference f ´ g tends to zero. For example,
x2 ` x
x2
Ñ 1 as x Ñ `8, yet the difference x grows arbitrarily large. But




































px´ 1q3 as xÑ 1










Let’s first use solid curves to sketch in what these asymptotic approximations
tell us. Then we’ll complete the graph by drawing dotted curves to join those
solid portions up in the most natural way:
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Of course, we don’t know the heights of the hills nor the depths of the valleys,
but this qualitatively correct sketch is still good enough to let us predict the
number (4 and 5) of extremes (‚) and inflections (˚) as well as their (very)
rough locations. Derivative calculations can now make those rough locations
precise. Often, as in this example, dia by itself provides so much information
that decis and its derivatives just confirm and fine-tune what we already
know. And that’s a comfortable position to be in.
9. guess bravely and beautifully
. . . the feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers
and of forms, of geometric elegance. It is a genuinely aesthetic
feeling, which all mathematicians know. –henri poincaré [18,
page 59]
Last time we defined the integral as a limit of Riemann sums, made some
comments on that definition, and then went through a couple of examples.
























Seth? That decimal reminds you of the natural log of 2? Wow, that’s a good





dt « ln 2








Do we imagine having that 2 appear on each side is an accident? Let’s be
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Do you notice anything here? Marianne? Right, the derivative of lnx is 1
x
,












Notice we now have the same reciprocal function in the integrand and on the
right hand side. What if we could replace that reciprocal function with any








Thinking about what would be beautiful and guessing bravely (and a bit
wildly), we have arrived at a stunning conjecture, which (if f is continuous)
turns out to be true. It’s called the first fundamental theorem of
calculus, and we shall prove it later next week! Amazing.
Early on in mathematics, probably by first grade, we learn to associate guess-
ing with ignorance: if you don’t know how to find the answer, you might as
well guess. Even in advanced mathematics, the standard textbook format —
here are some theorems, here are the proofs; here are some problems, sup-
ply the solutions — would appear to associate guessing, not with ignorance
perhaps, but with being ignored, since the format completely ignores the
role of guessing in mathematical work. Yet mathematicians themselves asso-
ciate guessing with creativity ! George Pólya, one of the great mathematical
problem solvers, put it this way:
You have to guess the mathematical theorem before you prove it:
you have to guess the idea of the proof before you carry through
the details. You have to combine observations and follow analo-
gies: you have to try and try again. The result of the mathemati-
cian’s creative work is demonstrative reasoning, a proof; but the
proof is discovered by plausible reasoning, by guessing. [19, page
vi]
The first part of our proverb, guess bravely, concerns the fear of guess-
ing instilled in us by our education. We must overcome that fear and guess
bravely — not wildly of course, not out of the blue, but based on exam-
ples, educated guessing, what Pólya calls plausible reasoning. The second
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part, guess beautifully, reminds us to let those guesses reflect our innate
belief in the underlying architectural beauty of nature, the Universe, and
mathematics.
10. understanding is translating
Would someone please remind me where we were at the end of class on
Monday? Ah, yes, thank you Gaard. We had just proved the second fun-
damental theorem of calculus (ftc ii). Here’s an alternate version
of this wonderful result:




F 1pxq dx “ F pbq ´ F paq.
One way to increase our understanding of this theorem, or indeed any math-
ematical statement, would be to translate that statement into a different
language. As an illustration, let’s translate ftc ii into three languages.
First, the magical language of Leibnizian infinitesimals: If dx represents the
length of the infinitely short interval rx, x ` dxs at x and dy represents the














dy “ ypbq ´ ypaq “ F pbq ´ F paq






F 1pxq dx “
F pbq ´ F paq
b´ a
average of all the
slopes along the graph
“ slope of the chord
Phrased this way, ftc ii seems quite surprising and pretty. And finally, the
language of physics: Given the trip of a particle along a line, the “average
velocity during the trip” has two natural interpretations, one industrious —
the average of all the instantaneous velocities during the trip — and one lazy:
the change in position over the change in time. ftc ii tells us that these
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two interpretations yield the same result. For if F ptq is the position of the






F 1ptq dx “
F pbq ´ F paq
b´ a
average of all the




Our three translations have helped us to understand ftc ii. Here the word
“understand” suggests something distinct from and perhaps beyond just ab-
sorbing the literal meaning, something deeper, more organic, intuitive, and
contextual. Any attempt to understand a given theorem in this sense will
involve some sort of translation. Even the seemingly neutral process of study-
ing the statement and its proof, for example, is a process of translation, from
the mathematical language on the page into the mental language of our own
interior mathematical landscape. Some translations help our understanding
by simplifying down to the kernel of the assertion, say by translating the de-
tailed symbolic statement into a prose sentence. Richard Feynman suggested
stripping a concept or statement down to its essentials, ending with a verbal
description that would make sense to a child.
In the translation of a theorem — whether into the language of geometry,
physics, or simple prose — the reproduction of exact literal meaning gives
way in order to underline the fundamental sense and intention of the original.
In his essay “The Task of the Translator,” Walter Benjamin (in a literary, not
mathematical context) argued that, “as regards the meaning, the language of
translation can — in fact, must — let itself go, so that it gives voice to the
intentio of the original not as reproduction but as harmony. . . .” [3, page 79]
11. celebrate your mistakes
A man’s mistakes are his portals of discovery.1 –james joyce
[14, page 182]
1A mistaken quotation: it’s apt, but not accurate. While Google attributes this saying
to James Joyce, what Joyce has Stephen Dedalus claim in Ulysses is actually quite dif-
ferent: “A man of genius makes no mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals
of discovery.” One reading: knowing full well that a given approach will fail, the man of
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Where did we end up last time? Anyone remember? Emily? Ah, yes, we had
just used the integral test to investigate the convergence of a p-series.







converges if and only if p ą 1.







Now before we test the convergence of this series, why don’t we see if the in-
tuition we have developed concerning the convergence of positive-term series
leads us to a conjecture.
intuition A positive-term series
ř
pn converges when and only when the
terms pn Ñ 0 sufficiently fast.
The question then is: do the terms
1
n lnn
Ñ 0 sufficiently fast? Well, we
















Ñ 0 sufficiently fast for
every q “ p´ 1 ą 0. Since we can make nq Ñ `8 more and more slowly by
choosing q closer and closer to 0, it seems that we should be able to make
















What’s remarkable is that I still remember thinking about just this series,
following this line of thought, and making this same conjecture, from when
I took calculus way back in 1967!! I also remember how I felt when the
genius follows it anyway, knowing also that the particular way it fails will open “portals
of discovery.”






dx “ lnplnxq|`82 “ `8
proved my conjecture wrong! I felt deflated, disappointed that my intuition
had led me astray. But really, looking back, I should have felt elated ! I should
have celebrated the opportunity to deepen my understanding, to sharpen my
intuition by finding where my thinking had gone wrong. And it was, of
course, in thinking that just because I could make nq Ñ `8 more and more
slowly by choosing q closer and closer to 0, that I could make nq Ñ `8 more





by L’Hôpital (really Johann Bernoulli) for any q ą 0.
My point being, celebrate your mistakes! See them as double joys, not
only signaling that our mathematical mental furniture is out of alignment
but also, once we trace our error back to its origins, placing a finger on the
particular chair, desk, or table that needs shifting. Without mistakes, we
don’t know what we don’t know.
12. explore the tug of war: cui dominetur?
The argument we gave yesterday proved the following theorem:





where pn ą 0, converges if pn Ó 0.
Before we go on to look at some alternating series examples, here’s a question:
Which of our proverbs has come up the most this year, in Calculus I and II?
Rowen? explore the tug of war? Yes, I think you’re right. And why
is that? Is it the most fundamental for life? No, that honor would probably
go to be awed, like a child or meaning before truth or god gives,
we choose. But explore the tug of war is certainly a fundamental
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proverb for calculus : because calculus rests on the limit concept, because
“All interesting limits involve a tug of war,” as I’ve said so often, and because
understanding its tug of war is the key to understanding a limit.
But why, I see you all wondering, am I bringing up the tug of war proverb
now? Well, because an alternating series represents the final tug of war
category that we’ll meet in this class, which makes this the perfect time to
look back and reflect on a few of the more memorable tug of wars (tugs of
















Here the top and bottom both tend to 0, creating a classic tug of war,
with the top team pulling the fraction toward 0 while the bottom team
pulls the fraction toward `8. The top team wins (dominates) when
n “ 1, the bottom team wins (dominates) when n “ 3, and there’s a
tie when n “ 2. As xÑ 0`, we say 1´ cosx tends to 0 faster than x,
slower than x3, and at the same rate as x2.
In the full proverb, explore the tug of war: cui dominetur?, the
question “Which dominates?” has two distinct interpretations: (a) Which
team dominates the tug of war? and (b) Which team members dominate
their teammates? The example above illustrates just the first interpretation,
while the next example illustrates both.
(2)
2x3 ` x2 ` x
3x3 ´ x2 ` 2x
as xÑ 0 and xÑ `8
When x Ñ 0 the top team and the bottom team both tend to 0,
setting up our tug of war. But as xÑ 0, x dominates its teammates on
the top team while 2x dominates its teammates on the bottom team,
and “dividing by the dominator”
2x3 ` x2 ` x
3x3 ´ x2 ` 2x
“
2x2 ` x` 1
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we see that neither team dominates, for the tug of war ends in a tie.
On the other hand, when xÑ `8 the top team and the bottom team
both tend toward `8, producing a different tug of war. Since, in this
case, 2x3 dominates its teammates on the top team and 3x3 dominates
its teammates on the bottom team, we “divide by the dominator” again
2x3 ` x2 ` x























n as nÑ 8




toward 1, while, at the same time, the exponent n pulls the expression








fpc` hq ´ fpcq
h
as hÑ 0
Obviously, every derivative derives from a tug of war, with the top





fpciq∆xi as mesh Ñ 0
Also every integral involves a tug of war, not with opposing teams
so much as opposing forces. As the mesh tends toward 0, the size of
each term in the Riemann sum tends toward 0, while the number of





pn ppn ą 0q
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converges if and only if the pull toward convergence produced by the
terms pn tending to 0 counteracts the pull toward `8 (and hence
divergence) produced by the number N of terms tending to 8.
basic intuition A positive-term series
ř8
n“1 pn converges if and only





p´1qn`1pn ppn ą 0q
When the series alternates, an extra force pulls toward convergence
– the cancellation created by the alternating signs — and as a result,
to ensure convergence of the series, the force produced by the terms
tending to 0 does not need to pull as hard as it did when the terms
were all positive. In fact, the terms pn no longer need to tend toward
0 “sufficiently fast”; they just need to decrease to 0, at any rate at all,
which is where we started the class:





where pn ą 0, converges if pn Ó 0.
13. too beautiful to be false
My work has always tried to unite the True with the Beautiful
and when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the
Beautiful. –hermann weyl [8]
As class ended on Wednesday, we had just stated a theorem on the nice
behavior of power series. We can’t prove it now, but you’ll see a proof if you
go on to the analysis course next year. Let’s get this theorem back up, on
the side board here, and take a look at some examples.
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playing with power series theorem (ppst) On the interior of its
interval of convergence, a power series acts like a polynomial : it’s infinitely
differentiable and all the basic operations (˘, ˆ, ˜, substitution,
ş
, p q1) can
be done term-by-term!
Let’s play. On the interval p´1, 1q, we have
1
1´ x
“ 1` x` x2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨
Applying the ppst, we replace x by ´x2 to see that
1
1` x2
“ 1´ x2 ` x4 ` ¨ ¨ ¨
Perhaps we should pause here. Remember that an algebraic function contains
only (and finitely many) additions, subtractions, divisions, multiplications,
rational powers, and rational roots), and a transcendental function is any
function that’s not algebraic. Thus a transcendental function “transcends”
algebra. For example, arctan is a transcendental function. In particular,
then, arctan transcends the polynomials: given any open interval, there is no
polynomial which equals arctan everywhere on that interval. But apparently,
if we allow our polynomials to go on forever, to become transcendental them-
selves, they can catch up to arctan, at least on the interval p´1, 1q: by the










´ ¨ ¨ ¨
Now we know this holds on p´1, 1q, but the ppst is mute about whether a
convergent power series ever “acts like a polynomial” even at the boundary
points of the open interval, in this case at ˘1. Just for fun, let’s see what










` ¨ ¨ ¨ !!!!
Oh, my god, this is far too beautiful to be false! Ah, you’re laughing.
I know, it sounds goofy: too beautiful to be false. But I’m really quite
serious.
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´ ¨ ¨ ¨
which holds for every x in p´1, 1q, and in particular, for every x just short of
the boundary at 1. It’s certainly possible that the equation also holds at 1,
and there’s some evidence that it might hold at 1, given that the statement











` ¨ ¨ ¨
a stunningly beautiful statement which lies on the “boundary of an interval
of true statements.” Would God, the architect of the universe, really be so
perverse as to make this lovely equality false? Personally, I don’t think so.
That would be like God smirking at us while singing na na na na boo boo.
Of course, we have proofs by induction, proofs by counterexample, contra-
position and contradiction, but no “proofs by beauty.” There are, however,















` ¨ ¨ ¨ converges, we then have, by
continuity at x “ 1,
π
4






` ¨ ¨ ¨
Abel assures us that God, at least this time, has not been perverse.
Recall Hermann Weyl’s statement concerning beauty and truth at the be-
ginning of this section: “My work has always tried to unite the True with
the Beautiful and when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the
Beautiful.” Perhaps Weyl had in mind that choosing the Beautiful over the
True in the moment often led to a deeper truth in the end.
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14. do you believe in magic?
I don’t like magic — but I have been known to make guys dis-
appear. –mr. t [24] [leaving behind, one assumes, the ghosts of
departed quantities!]
From your reading last week in Calculus Gems [21] on Leibniz and the
Bernoulli brothers, you may remember that Leibniz employed a marvelously
productive way of thinking about calculus which involved “infinitesimals”
— quantities supposedly smaller than any other quantity yet not zero. Of
course, in our standard real number system, such infinitesimals do not exist,
since given any real number r ą 0, no matter how small, r{2 is smaller. Nev-
ertheless, Leibniz and his followers made wonderful discoveries using these
intuitive, magical, nonexistent quantities, taking mathematics on the conti-
nent well beyond the mathematics in Britain, where, due to Newton’s worries
about the lack of rigor, infinitesimals were effectively banned.
Actually, Leibniz agreed with Newton that infinitesimals did not exist. In a
letter written in 1706, he was quite clear about this: “Philosophically speak-
ing, I no more believe in infinitely small quantities than in infinitely great
ones . . . I consider both as fictions of the mind for succinct ways of speak-
ing, appropriate to the calculus. . . .” [13, page 159] He was more willing
than Newton, though, to let these infinitesimals direct not only his thinking
but also his writing about calculus problems. It seems that Leibniz believed
in the fruitfulness of his magical thinking, but not in the existence of his
magical quantities. Still fruitful even today, Leibniz’s infinitesimal intuitions
survive encoded in his flexible, evocative, and magical notations: where dx









fpxq dx “ the ”sum” of all the ”products” fpxq ¨ dx from x “ a to x “ b
To see an illustration of Leibnizian magical thinking, let’s rotate the graph
G of f lying over the interval ra, bs about the x-axis to generate a surface of
revolution M . Suppose the infinitesimal portion of the graph G which lies
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over the interval rx, x ` dxs has length ds, and suppose that portion of G,
rotated about the x-axis, generates an infinitesimal strip of M having area









































Such infinitesimal manipulations can be used, like we did here, to come up
with conjectures, which then must be established rigorously by other means,
in this case by careful Riemann sum arguments. But this magical Leibnizian
thinking can also be used in the reverse direction, not to produce a conjecture,
but to produce insight into a given expression or equation that might appear
in an advanced text or a research article on ecology, say, or biology.
For example, suppose an ecology text claims, without explanation, that the
following equation has been used to predict the population ppT q of humpback
whales along the Alaskan coastline T years from the present:
ppT q “ pp0qspT q `
ż T
0
rptqspT ´ tq dt
Here rptq is the birth rate and sptq is the “survival fraction”: given any P
humpback whales, Psptq are expected to be alive t years later. Is this a
plausible formula for ppT q? Well, thinking like Leibniz, the product rptq dt
should be the number of humpbacks born during the time interval rt, t` dts,
and by the time T only rptq dt¨spT´tq of those should still be alive. Adding up
these survivors over the interval r0, T s, we get the integral
şT
0
rptqspT ´ tq dt.
We then have to add to this the number of humpbacks alive at t “ 0 who
would be expected to survive until time T , namely pp0qspT q. So although
we may have no idea how well the given estimate for ppT q actually works to
predict the population of humpbacks, Leibnizian infinitesimals have at least
supplied the formula with some plausibility.
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15. follow the veil: be moved by mystery
There are two ways to live: you can live as if nothing is a miracle;
you can live as if everything is a miracle. The most beautiful
experience we can have is the mysterious. It is the source of all
true art and science. –albert einstein [9]
We’re going to celebrate the last day of Calculus II by talking about complex
numbers. In high school, we are told that complex numbers have the form
x` iy, where x and y are real numbers and i “
?
´1 is “imaginary.” We are
then told that we can add and multiply these complex numbers normally,
the way we do real numbers, except that we should always replace i2 by ´1.
Of course, this is all very mysterious: “The nature, mother of the eternal
diversities, or the divine spirit . . . has invented,” wrote Leibniz, “this elegant
and admirable proceeding, this wonder of Analysis, prodigy of the universe of
ideas, a kind of hermaphrodite between existence and non-existence, which
we have named imaginary root.” [15]
Let’s see if we can we lift the veil on these complex numbers. We all know
how to add points in the plane, using vector addition, and multiply points
by real numbers, using scalar multiplication. But we’ve never seen a product
of points, where the product is another point: px, yqpu, vq “ p , q. Such a
new and presumably fundamental operation, if it exists, would surely turn
the plane into a lush and fruitful plain. For think about the real line. In
its fertile soil grows so much beautiful mathematics — all the elementary
functions, limits, calculus, analysis generally, and a huge harvest of theo-
rems and applications — but take away the multiplication of real numbers
and that dark, rich earth becomes pale, desert sand. With no multiplication
of points, surely the plane must be just as barren. Yet with an appropriate
product of points, together with its vector addition and scalar multiplication,
we imagine the plane would become as fertile as the Amazon jungle, with ele-
mentary functions, derivatives, integrals, sequences, series, and power series,
all growing wildly in a tangle of stunning theorems and applications.
But how should this “appropriate” product be defined? Perhaps we should
do what mathematicians so often do in this sort of situation, where they’re
looking for the right way to define something: use the properties we would
like that something to satisfy to help us narrow the choices down to one.
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Of course, what we’d like and what’s possible are often two different things.
We might be overly optimistic in writing out our wish list, only to find that
no definition of the product will give us every property on our list. But
keeping this in mind, we certainly would like our product to be associative
and commutative, it should distribute over the vector addition, there should
be a neutral point, probably p1, 0q, for this product, and all points (except the
origin) should be invertible. Oh, and we really need the following property
as well: because points on the x-axis can be viewed both as points in the
plane and as real numbers, they can be multiplied both as points and as real
numbers, and the two products must be consistent. So however we define
the product, for points on the x-axis we must have px, 0qpu, 0q “ pxu, 0q. In
other words, our product on the plane must extend the product we already
have for points on the x-axis (viewed as real numbers).
Concentrating on this extension property, let’s think about how we multiply
real numbers. Using polar notation xr, θy, we have
´2 ¨ 3 “ ´6
x2, πy ¨ x3, 0y “ x6, πy
“ x2 ¨ 3, π ` 0y
So in a product of real numbers, the lengths multiply and the angles add!
And of course this way of multiplying real numbers, and hence this way of
multiplying points on the x-axis, extends in a totally natural way to the
entire plane:
definition Given points z “ xr, θy and w “ xρ, φy in the plane, the product
zw :“ xrρ, θ ` φy is called complex multiplication.
One can then verify that this complex multiplication satisfies every property
on our wish list!
definition By the complex plane C we mean the real plane R2 endowed
with vector addition, scalar multiplication, and complex multiplication. By
a complex number we mean any point in this complex plane.
Noting that multiplication by the point i :“ p0, 1q produces a counterclock-
wise rotation by a right angle and writing x and y for px, 0q and py, 0q, we
can relate our new definition of complex number to the mysterious x ` iy
notation:
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px, yq “ px, 0q ` p0, yq
“ px, 0q ` p0, 1qpy, 0q
“ x` iy
where i2 “ p0, 1q2 “ p´1, 0q “ ´1 !! The imaginary number i “
?
´1,
which couldn’t be found among the real numbers, has been found in a higher
dimension: it’s the point p0, 1q in the complex plane!
Having unveiled one mystery, we turn to a deeper mystery. Question: How
should we define ez when z “ px, yq “ x` iy is a complex number? However
we define ex`iy, we certainly want the basic exponential property — turning
sums into products — to still hold, which means ex`iy should equal exeiy,
but this reduces defining ex`iy to defining eiy. Now it turns out that much
of what we’ve learned in Calculus II about infinite series of real numbers
extends quite naturally to infinite series of complex numbers. Instead, for
example, of an interval of convergence, we now have a disk of convergence.
It would make sense, then, to define eiy as the sum of the exponential series:
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y5 ´ ¨ ¨ ¨ q
eiy “ cos y ` i sin y !!!
Here is the long hidden, but sometimes glimpsed, intimate connection be-
tween the exponential and trigonometric worlds, first discovered by Leonhard
Euler! [10, Chapter VIII] And when y “ π, we find:
eiπ ` 1 “ 0 !!!
Viewed by physicists and mathematicians as one of, if not the, most beautiful
equation in the world, this relationship, Euler’s equation, connects, in a
stunningly simple way, the five most fundamental mathematical constants
(1, π, 0, i, e), invented (discovered?) in very different times for very different
reasons. 1: shrouded in prehistory, π: Egypt 1850 bc, 0: Mesopotamia 3
bc, i: Heron of Alexandria 50 ce, e: Leibniz 1690. Euler’s equation should
make chills race up your mathematical spine.
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Rowen? You’d rather feel chills race up your physical spine? Ah, yes, I totally
get it: containing only mathematical constants, Euler’s equation seems, well,
abstract. Let’s see if I can think of an equation that will produce the kind of
chills you’re after. Hm, how about this one: no less mysterious and at least
as deep as Euler’s equation, the following relationship involves not only the
five mathematical constants above, but also, unbelievably, eight fundamental
physical constants! It will leave your physics friends and faculty speechless:
cGhε0qeαµ0mepe
iπ
` 1q “ 0 !!!
[laughter and groans]
Of course, instead of being silly, we really should give Rowen’s reaction to
Euler’s equation the serious attention it deserves.
E “ mc2, ∇ˆ E “ ´BB
Bt
, ∆P ∆x ě
~
2
, . . .
— the equations of physics naturally excite us, for they describe the physical
world as we know it, from black holes and pulsars to bridges and turbulence
to the interactions of elementary particles. In contrast, the equations of pure
mathematics, such as Euler’s equation, containing neither physical constants
nor physical quantities, can appear sterile and empty, the fruits of a mean-
ingless, abstract game. But mathematics is no game; it is the language and
study of abstract structures and patterns. It certainly applies, deeply and in
detail, to the “real world,” for to the extent that a physical structure or pat-
tern resembles an abstract structure or pattern, the mathematics of the latter
may be applied to approximate or model the physics of the former. This is
how mathematical modeling works: abstract mathematics models real world
phenomena.
But in a very real (or non-real) sense, mathematics also bears on immutable
and eternal truth, truths beyond and independent of the evolving and tran-
sient physical universe we happen to reside in, truths that would hold in any
universe. And Euler’s equation, eiπ ` 1 “ 0, being one such beautiful truth,
makes chills race up both my mathematical and physical spines!
16. philosophy matters (aka i’ll see it when i believe it)
Once a mathematician has seen that his perception of the “self-
evident correctness” of the law of excluded middle [bivalence] is
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nothing more than the linguistic equivalent of an optical illusion,
neither his practice of mathematics nor his understanding of it
can ever be the same. –gabriel stolzenberg [23, page 268]
Well, we finished that topic earlier than anticipated! Hmm, what to do
with the twenty minutes we have left? I know, let’s talk philosophy! Ah,
I can see the question in your faces: What’s philosophy got to do with
mathematics? After all, in philosophy the central questions have no single,
agreed upon answer, while in mathematics rigorous proofs settle questions
definitively. Philosophy is all about continuing debate; mathematics is all
about preventing debate.
Nevertheless, philosophy has a crucial role to play in mathematics, and the
philosophical choices we make can determine how mathematics is done! We
may have ignored philosophical issues in this class, but they lie at the heart
of what we’ve been doing. In fact, nearly all mathematicians follow proce-
dures sanctified by a particular philosophical stance toward mathematical
statements.
Take, for example, the procedure we use in a proof by contradiction: in or-
der to prove a mathematical statement S, we show that the negation of S
implies a contradiction. The force of this argument stems from a philosoph-
ical assumption about mathematical statements: that they are either true
or false, independent of our knowing (or being able to know) which. This
“bivalence” or “excluded middle” assumption is not one that mathematicians
make consciously. Rather it’s a background assumption, built into the way
they see mathematical statements. Why? Partly because the present-tense
language we use in mathematics — referring to sets, functions, sequences,
spaces, and so on, as if they were pre-existing shells on a beach — creates
a nearly irresistible sense of reality. Such language is then taken literally, as
referring to “things” that stand apart from us. A mathematical statement is
then quite naturally seen as a statement about these “things” and therefore,
taken this way, a mathematical statement will be seen as having to be either
true or false, from which then follows, in particular, the force of an argument
by contradiction: if the negation of a statement S implies a contradiction,
then that negation cannot be true, and hence (using bivalence) S must be
true.
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i’ll see it when i believe it: if we believe in the existence of these math-
ematical “things” that stand apart from us, we then see any mathematical
statement, since it refers to such “things,” as being obviously true or false
independent of our knowing.
But there are other quite natural ways of viewing a mathematical statement.
Such an assertion could be seen, for instance — and here I’ll read from a
delightfully meticulous paper by Gabriel Stolzenberg –
as an announcement, or signal, that one is in possession of
a certain piece of [mathematical] knowledge . . . knowledge that
one is in a position to share; for example, by using language to
specify certain procedures that are to be followed in order to
attain this knowledge. From this standpoint, to inquire about
some statement whether ”it might be true, independent of our
knowing it” is merely idle talk, devoid of substance. For there are
not literally “things” as “statements,” only acts “of stating.” [23,
page 245]
Nouns have become verbs : mathematics as the study of mathematical “things”
has morphed into mathematics as the study of mathematical “acts.” This
philosophical stance stems from the belief that the foundations of mathe-
matics, that most rational and precise of disciplines, ought to rest, not on
talk, but on knowledge, knowledge that one can share.
Under this view, when would it be correct to assert a given mathematical
statement S? “Since such a statement,” continues Stolzenberg, “is supposed
to be a signal that one knows that S is true, it is correct to assert it when one
does know that S is true and it is incorrect when one does not.” And again,
one “knows that S is true” when “one is in possession of a certain piece of
[mathematical] knowledge . . . knowledge that one is in a position to share.”
Now observe that taking this (quite natural) philosophical stance completely
blunts the force of an argument by contradiction: proving that the negation
of the assertion S implies a contradiction provides certainty that no one will
ever be in a position to assert the negation of S, but does not in general
provide that “certain piece of [mathematical] knowledge,” that piece being a
proof, required to assert correctly that S is true!
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Switching from the view that a mathematical statement refers to “things”
that stand apart from us (the “bivalence view”) to the view that asserting a
mathematical statement signals that one possesses a proof of that statement
(the “signal view”) alters not just the force of an argument by contradiction,
but so much more. The meanings of existence, negation, and disjunction,
what counts as a legitimate method of proof, what counts as a legitimate
definition, the meanings of theorems, what counts as a theorem, what ques-
tions should be asked, what problems should be investigated — all of this
changes!
philosophy matters: The philosophical stance we take toward mathemat-
ical statements shapes the landscape of mathematics !
Before we run out of time, we’ll look at one small part of that mathematical
landscape, first from the “bivalence view” and then from the “signal view.”
We’ve mentioned twin primes before: 3 and 5, 5 and 7,11 and 13, and so on.
At the present time, no one know whether there are an infinite number of
twin primes or a finite number. Now, set
n :“
#
1 if there are infinitely many twin primes
0 if there are finitely many twin primes
p‹q
and ask: Does this assignment p‹q define an integer? If T stands for the
assertion, “there are infinitely many twin primes,” then under the “bivalence
view” of mathematical statements, T is either true or false, so that n is
definitely either 1 or 0, we just don’t know which. Hence the assignment p‹q
defines an integer. But under the “signal view” of mathematical statements,
to assert that n “ 1 or n “ 0 is to signal that one is in possession of a proof
that there are infinitely many twin primes or one is in possession of a proof
that there are finitely many twin primes. Because, at the present time, no
one has either, the assignment p‹q does not define an integer.
The answer to that most fundamental, gut-level mathematical question –
“What is an integer?” — has been altered dramatically by a change in phi-
losophy. philosophy matters!
Uh-oh, I see by the clock that we’ve gone into overtime. Sorry, got carried
away!
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But before you go, let me leave you with one final thought on this philosophy
business. One of our proverbs has surfaced so often this semester that it
could be seen as a theme for the course: meaning before truth. And
it surfaces here as well, in a truly basic way: the meaning of the statement
“the assignment (‹) defines an integer” must come before its truth.
And so too in life: Agree on meaning before debating truth.
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